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who think we professors decide the truth of religion in the classroom. But there 
are more graduates of those classrooms who know that "in the real world" 
institutional change is not so easily brought about by individual intellectual 
debate. In most churches practical-minded clergy control the reins of power, not 
professors. 
Nevertheless, can university professors become so powerful that they can 
induce institutional change? Plato wanted philosophers to become kings in order 
to overcome this split between the yogi and the commissar. Surely Hans Kiing 
must ask himself this question. Should theology professors become popes or 
should popes become revisionary theologians? To accomplish doctrinal and 
institutional change it is not enough to publish books or even to travel on the 
lecture circuit. That has been done before. Quakers, Congregationalists, and 
Baptists have long worked out doctrinal truth each for himself or herself. But 
is that avenue open to a Roman Catholic even in this day? 
Metaphysics: Constructing a World View, by William Hasker. Downers Grove, 
IL: Inter Varsity Press, 1983, pp. 132. Paper, $4.95. 
Reviewed by THOMAS V. MORRIS, University of Notre Dame. 
Like many of the readers of this journal, I regularly initiate undergraduates 
into the ways of philosophy. My introductory lecture course begins with a couple 
of weeks on the nature of rational belief, moves on into some of the classic 
problems of metaphysics, and culminates in an examination of some questions 
central to the philosophy of religion. In the past, I have used the most recent 
edition of Richard Taylor's Metaphysics (Prentice Hall) to cover the second 
segment of the course. The next time around, I plan to use this new little book 
by Hasker instead. Although he covers a narrower range of issues than Taylor, 
the simplicity and clarity of Hasker's exposition, as well as the general accessi-
bility of his argumentation to philosophical novices, in my opinion make Hasker's 
book preferable to Taylor's for this sort of context. Moreover, this is a book 
which can hold the attention of the non-philosophical reader, the average student 
as well as the intelligent layperson. It employs to great effect various pedagogical 
devices, such as well chosen quotations and illuminating illustrations, often with 
a touch of humor. All in all, it succeeds in its appointed task admirably well. 
What that task is should be made clear. Metaphysics is the second volume to 
have appeared in the new Contours of Christian Philosophy series edited by C. 
Stephen Evans of St. Olaf College and published by a popular, evangelical 
Christian press. The, books in this series are to be short, introductory level texts, 
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written from a distinctively Christian point of view. As such, they will certainly 
be welcomed by those who teach philosophy in the Christian college setting. 
However, judging from the volumes I have seen, their appeal is meant to be 
much broader than that. They are written in such a way as to be useful in a more 
secular setting as well. And this is what we find in Metaphysics. Hasker makes 
clear the nature of the faith commitment which underlies his life and activity as 
a philosopher, and mentions throughout the book the relevance of Christian 
convictions to the topics being discussed. What is most important to remark 
upon, though, is the way in which he does this. His tone is always judicious, 
his claims careful and modest. Although his Christian convictions serve to guide 
him at various points, never could they be judged to intrude into a line of 
argument in such a way as to distort what is said, from a philosophical point of 
VIew. 
The concerted effort to publish a number of philosophical books, all represen-
tative of a distinctive sort of world view is, of course, not unprecedented. 
Prometheus has been doing it for years. What is novel is to see such an effort 
whose products need not be found distasteful by readers not sharing the operative 
world view. Hasker, Evans, and Inter Varsity deserve congratulations for the 
measured and fair tone of the present volume. 
Chapter one, "Introducing Metaphysics," helpfully starts out with some 
methodological remarks on how metaphysical problems can be addressed and 
how metaphysical views can be evaluated. Parallels are suggested between stan-
dard criteria for the appraisal of scientific hypotheses and criteria which may be 
applied in the assessment of metaphysical positions. The suggestions here are 
extremely sketchy, but will not be faulted for that, for coming as they do at the 
very beginning of the book, they serve to give the non-philosophical reader some 
helpful bearings without confusing him with too much meta-metaphysical detail 
at the outset. 
However, the methodological parallels drawn between science and metaphysics 
in this chapter do begin to generate a problem which appears fully only in a 
later chapter. Hasker does not clearly enough differentiate between metaphysics 
and the natural sciences. He never gives an explicit and general definition of 
metaphysics, but seems to understand it to be the most general study of ultimate 
reality. During a discussion of instrumentalism and scientific realism in chapter 
four, this leads him to say: 
The chief positive benefit of scientific realism for metaphysics is that 
if this perspective is accepted, a great deal of our best scientific knowl-
edge becomes metaphysical knowledge as well. Science will be, quite 
literally, "falsifiable metaphysics." Scientific theories will be not merely 
calculational devices for predicting experimental results and promoting 
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better technology (though they be that), but valid insights into the nature 
of reality. (98) 
But is every insight into the nature of reality a piece of metaphysics? Surely, 
the paradigmatic problems and methods of metaphysics are interestingly different 
from those of, say, physics, as the logical positivists were fond of pointing out. 
But of course, just as surely, there are intriguing relations between metaphysics 
and the natural sciences distinct from other than any simple inclusion of the 
latter in the former. There have been important recent explorations into just these 
issues, for example, in George Schlesinger's fascinating book, Metaphysics: 
Methods and Problems (Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1983). Hasker's perspec-
tive seems not to have been informed by any of this recent work. Minimally, 
the inclusion view he seems to favor requires a bit more exposition and defense 
than he gives it in order to have any plausibility at all. 
Another problem for the book also comes to light in this first chapter. Hasker 
has what will seem to many readers to be an inadequate conception of the 
relevance of Christian faith to philosophy and an insufficient view of the possible 
inter-relation of philosophy and theology. He conceives of philosophy as "a 
completely nondogmatic subject," and specifies that "Nothing is accepted merely 
on authority, no matter how reputable" (20), re-emphasizing the point later by 
saying that "religious authority cannot be accepted as a basis for philosophical 
assertions," and characterizing philosophy as "a free and independent investiga-
tion of fundamental issues" (23). There is a sense in which this sounds more 
like Enlightenment rhetoric than a Christian conception of philosophy. Why 
can't any religious authority, or the fact that a proposition is proposed for our 
assent by a source accepted by Christians as authoritative, serve as a basis for 
philosophical assertions? As a matter of fact, it seems to me that his Christian 
convictions, persumably derived from some authority (the Bible, the Christian 
tradition, the Holy Spirit), do serve as a basis (among others) for some of the 
most important metaphysical views Hasker philosophically asserts and defends. 
It is a surprise that he does not recognize this in the few methodological paragraphs 
he devotes to commenting on the relation between faith and philosophy in this 
chapter and elsewhere. He even seems to go out of his way to separate the 
content of faith from the context of philosophy, as for example when he remarks, 
in the Epilog entitled "A Christian Metaphysic?", on Christian salvation, that 
"concerning this great gift philosophy cannot speak ... " (121). Why not? Can 
there not be illuminating philosophical reflection on Christian claims concerning 
salvation, for instance, on the doctrine of the atonement? 
There are points at which Hasker misses the relevance of distinctively Christian, 
or theistic, commitments to interesting questions concerning metaphysics. Con-
sider for example his apparent understanding of metaphysics as the most general 
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study of what there is, or, more specifically, of ultimate reality. Let's consider 
that as a fomlal definition of 'metaphysics.' Many philosophers object to such 
a definition by pointing out that if materialism (naturalism) is true, physics is 
the most general study of what there is, and of ultimate reality. And, contrary 
to what Hasker seems to hold without justification and in the fact of clear 
indications to the contrary, physics is not metaphysics. So if materialism is true, 
the definition is wrong. If materialism is even possibly true, there is a possible 
world in which physics is the most general study. But the proposed definition 
is correct, and thus an analytic, necessary truth, only if there is no possible 
world in which something is the most general study without being metaphysics, 
that is, only if materialism is not possibly true. And of course, materialism is 
not possibly true only if, necessarily, some non-material (e.g. spiritual) being 
exists. And, interestingly, precisely this is entailed by an Anselmian, Christian 
theism, a theology according to which one spiritual, non-material being, God, 
necessarily exists. So, for an Anselmian Christian theist, the understanding of 
metaphysics Hasker assumes can form a perfectly acceptable, general definition 
of 'metaphysics.' 
Although I would not expect arguments of even this level of complexity to 
appear in such a book as Metaphysics is intended to be, I am slightly disappointed 
that there is not more explicit recognition in this book of the sorts of fruitful 
results distinctively Christian commitments can have in the realm of metaphysics. 
Chapter two, "Freedom and Necessity," lays out our common belief in our 
limited but real freedom of will and examines the various standard challenges 
to this belief. Hasker first argues an incompatibilist line and then attempts to 
undermine the credentials of determinism. The chapter is well done. 
Chapter three, "Minds and Bodies," considers various views on what a human 
person is. Hasker raises problems with both materialism and traditional dualism, 
and offers for our consideration a sort of minimal dualism which he has explored 
elsewhere and labelled 'emergentism.' Chapter four, "The World," looks at a 
range of issues involving scientific realism and instrumentalism. And the last 
chapter, "God and the World," categorizes various traditional and contemporary 
views on the existence of a God and the relation of such a being to the natural 
world. Naturalism, pantheism, panentheism, and classical theism are briefly 
canvassed and evaluated. Theism is recommended. 
Throughout, this book evinces a scholarly humility which is all too rare. It is 
attractively written and well produced. I predict that a good many instructors of 
philosophy will judge it to be just the sort of book to put into the hands of 
beginners. 
